
Class 
look. 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT 



PSYCHOLOGY. 

AN ABREVIATION 



v. H, BIDDISON, A. M. 



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IVIAY 14 1895 



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AN INSTITUTE COURSE 

_ — IN 

PSYCHOLOGY. 

NINETEEN - LESSONS. 

Y)limDDISON, A, M, 

li 

Ex-Superintendent of Public Instruction, 
Marshall County, Kansas. 



Maiy.>ville, Kansas. 

'koplk's advocate vkint 

1895. 




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Z(n//Z1L ^^.^^ 



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This book is dedicated to those 
who have found or may find it useful. 

The A^ithor, 



Copyriglited by Y. H. Biddison. 1805. 



PI^BFASB. 



In my Teachers' In>;t!tute last year, I pre- 
sented the subject of psycliolog-y by lectures, 
and while the examination papers on Theory 
and Practice (wliicli is largely psychology) at 
the following examination showed improve- 
ment, the work was unsatisfactory, because 
the class was without text books, and I knew 
of none so inexpensive as to be within the 
reach of all, nor so brief and concise in defi- 
nition as to be adapted to the brevity of time 
and the plane of the average student. So I 
have ^ftndertalven to prepare this course for 
my teacher-pupils in '92, and for such other 
demand as its merits may create. 

The work on psychology must be academic. 
It cannot be of the normal type; it is ah ini- 
tio. 

My method is deductive, dogmatic. In 
truth, the method of the teacher is deductoni: 
by that m3tho3, the fool's school of exper- 
ience is avoided and one generation begins 
where the last quit, and having learned the 
known, corrects errors and carries on further 
investigation by inducfcion. I have not space 
to discuss; I assume. This "course" is merely 
a jointe:! skeleton of the subject; to it the 
living teaclici' must add the muscle of appli- 
cation, and the student, the fat of illustra- 
tion. 



I present little tluit is new; my Iiope is to 
excel- in brevity and clearness of statement. 
I do not hope to be so clear as tc^ be unJer- 
stood without thought, but so clear as to pro- 
voke thought. I wish to be so explicit that 
no thoughtful reader will misunderstand, even 
if he disagree, and so plain that just criti- 
cism may not be evaded by ambiguity of 
words or sentences. 

If this plaiUy inexpensive treatment shall 
meet with the approval of Institute Instruct- 
ors and help to popularize the study among 
the teachers of the state, it will have ful- 
tillcd the purpose for which it was written. 

It has been prepared hurriedly in the office 
in the midst of other pressijig duties. My 
iiidebtecliicss to Prof. JJowne in writing on 
the Intellect, and to Dr. Munsell on the 
S.^nsibility, is too great to be exproised by 
(liiotation marks. I wish, also, to acknowl- 
edge the valuable assistance of Jas. P. East- 
erly in editing the MS. 

V. H. BiDDISON. 
SUPKIJINTENDENT'S OFFICE. 

Marysville, Kan.^ June i. 1892. 



PRBFASB 

TO 

SECOND EDITION. 



The demand justifies this second edition. 
One of our leading educators says, "It is al- 
together too elementary." That certainly 
justifies it, A college student tells me that 
when he wants to find what tlie two-volume 
work used by the class is trying to say he 
turns to this to find out. That justifies it. 
A teacher writes, "It aroused within me bet- 
ter purposes and ambitions." Surely that 
justifies it. "You have certainly given the 
teachers of Kansas a concise, complete and 
most valuable exposition of the principles of 
psychology applied to the teacher's work," 
writes an Institute Conductor. I have found 
it useful in my Institute work, so feeling that 
the first edition has filled its purpose, I issue 
this one believing that it is not only adapted 
to teacher's Institutes, but to High School 
courses of study. 

I have made some changes in the text 
mostly in the interest of clearness and sever- 
al quotations, so terse that I could not afford 
to omit them, have been added. One chap- 
ter has been divided and enlarged and a brief 
vocabulary added. The latter I have felt was 
necessary as a connecting link between this 
and more voluminous works. 

Y. H. B. 



ELEMENTS OF PSYCllOLOOY. 



LESSO]^ I. 



FUNDAMENTAL DEFINITIONS. 
"I think, therefore I am."— Descartes. 

Psychology is tliat department of science 
which treats of the mind, its acts, and tlie 
laws of its action and development. 

Mind is tiiat form of being whicli thinks, 
feels, and wills. 

The existence of mind is so basal a fact as 
to be almost beyond proof, its existence be- 
ing imxMed in every elfort to prove it. Proof 
is only an elfort to reach certainty, that is, 
knowledge, and is only applicable to those 
things of which we are not yet sure. Al- 
though the mind is unseen like oxygen, un- 
heard like the rose, and unfelt like light, it 
is known by that subtle sometliing called 
consciousness which is the essential element 
in the action of all the senses. 

What mind is we know only by its acts, as 
we know what any other thing is. We know 
of the existence and nature of iron only by 
its acts. It reflects light— we say we see it. 
It tends powerfully to fall to the earth — we 
say it is heavy. It resists blows— we say it 
is hard. If it did not act upon us we would 



not know of its existence and we have no 
idea of its nature or of the nature of any 
other form of being except tlie manner of its 
action. ' So of the mind, we Imow nothino^ 
but its existence and sucli ideas as we may 
form of its nature from its acts. What iron, 
is apart from its acts, we Imow not. Wliat 
mind is apart from its acts, we l^now not. 
Challc is something (I Icnow not what) tliat 
is white, light, soft, friable, brittle. Mind is 
something (I know not what) that is thought- 
ful, passionate, willful. The distinguishing 
acts of mind are thinking, feeling, and will- 
ing. The faculties, or powers by virtue of 
which it acts, are, 

INTELLECT, the power by which we obtain 
knowledge and think; 

Sensibility, the power by which we feel; 

Will, the power by which we choose and 
act. 

The mind is one, a unit. There are not 
three parts, but three powers of the mind. 
These powers are not independent; do not 
act or exist separately. The divisions are 
not in the mind or of the mind, but by the 
mind. In other words, the elements of men- 
tal action are abstractions and not, like chem- 
ical elements, capable of separate existence. 

Thinking (and by this term I mean to in- 
clude all forms of knowing) is scarcely defin- 
able, yet you know and I know what mental 
act is indicated by the word. Its elements 
are sensation and intuition. 

Sensation is the primary change in the 
state of the mind produced by an impression 
on an organ of sense. 

Intuition is the mind's power of origina- 
ting in the presence of proper stimuli, such as 



sensation, certain necessary ideas, and primi- 
Live judgments. 

From tlie union of these two elements and 
their mental digestion is evolved the whole 
thought process. 



LESSOR 11. 

SENSATION AND INTUITION* 

Sensation is the first change in the state 
of the mind which is produced by an impres- 
sion on an organ of sense; or it is the mind's 
reaction against the action of other things. 

The impression is the action of the outer 
world on one of the five organs of sense, the 
eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, or the skin, 
filled with the nerves of touch, by means of 
a ray of light, a sound wave, an odor, a solu- 
ble substance, or a resisting body. This im- 
pression is transferred by means of the nerve 
to the brain. 

I:»[either the eye, nor the optic nerve, nor 
the brain itself sees, or has the sensation of 
sight. ISTeither does the mind know of any 
change in the eye, nor is it conscious of any 
change in the optic nerve, nor in fact of its 
existence, but the change is a change of its 
own state. It is in action. It becomes a 
conscious soul, but conscious only of its own 
state. 

The second mental change (not in order of 
time, but logical order) is the act of intui- 
tion. 

Intuition is the mind's power of origina- 



ting in the presence of proper stimuli^ %ucli as 
sensation, certain necessary ideas and primi- 
tive truths, or judgments. The test^^ot hitiiition 
is necessity; that is, an idea to be classed as 
intuitive, and not derived from experience, 
must be necessary to all thought; an element 
without which sensation becomes meaning- 
less, and the mind a blank on which the 
outer world would make impressions (sensa- 
tions) that, like the letters of a school hoy^ 
are an alphabet, but spell nothing. 

But the intuition brings forth its products: 
first, the— 

Necessauy Ideas of (1) being, (2) cause, (3) 
time, (4) space, and (5) number. In the tirst 
sensation the mind, being acted upon and re- 
acting, becomes conscious; conscious of two 
things, "self" and "not self;"* and accounts 
for the sensation (change in my state) by as- 
signing "nofc self" as its cause. . And the 
idea of space arises when "not self" (the 
cause of sensation) is located as not only not 
part of me, but as apart from me. And the 
idea of time arises with the beginning and 
ending of the sensation. A sensation is now, 
was then in i3rogress. Three other ideas 
arise, (1) the true, (the real and unreal), (2) 

*The baby, new to earth and sky 

What tim^ his tender palm is pressed 

Against the circle of the breast, 
Has never thought that this is I. 
But as he grows, he gathers much, 

And learns the use ol: I nud me, 

Aud ttnds I ara not wliat I see. 
And other than the things I touch; 
So rounds he to a separatf^ mind, 

From whence clear mem )rv may begin. 

As tiiro' the frame that binds him in, 
His isolation grows (.iefineA.—Tetiiiytion. 



tlie heautifal, (the pleasing), and (3) the good^ 
(right or wrong); and se^ioni— 
The Primitive Judgments; these are— 

I. The Laws of Thought; they are — 

1. The law of ideni3ity, 

Anythhig whatever is exactly equal to 
itself; or, in other vords, the whole is 
equal to the sum of its parts. 

2. The law of contradiction. 

What is contradictory is unthinkable. 
S. The law of excluded middle. 

If one of two contradictory attributes 

is affirmed, the other is by imxolication 

denied. 
4. The law of reason. 

Every change has a cause. 

II. The Axioms of Mathematics; they are — 

1. Things equal to the same thing are 
equal to each other. 

2. A straight line is the shortest distance 
between two points; etc. 

III. The Demands of Conscience; they are — 

1. I ought to do right, 

2. I ought not to do wrong. 

You will see that these "primitive judg- 
ments" are derived from the "necessary 
ideas" originating in the intuition. Some of- 
them will seem meaningless to all save those 
who have studied logic or mathematics, be- 
cause both the "ideas" and "judgments" are 
abstract. These do not all arise in the first 
sensation, and perhaps never in this abstract 
form except in the highly cultured or remark- 
ably endowed mind. 



LESSOi;r HI. 

PERCEPTION. 

The combination of sensation and intuition 
is perception, or linowing. Sensation is so 
nearly a passive state tliat it can scarcely be 
distinguished from feeling,* and so far as it 
is an act of knowledge, it is a knowledge of 
our own selves, not of the outer world, in 
process of change of state. The knowledge 
offered in intuition is decidedly mental and 
interior — is not of things, but of their rela- 
tions. But in the combination of the two, 
the mind accounts for its sensation by pic- 
turing forth the outer world as the cause. 
It constructs the outer world in such form 
as to account for its various sensations. In 
this sense do we see that to account for the 
impressions made on our minds through the 
eye, we assume the existence of an object 
without, say a tree, if that best explains the 
individual character of the impression. We 
do not see the object with the eye, nor see the 
image of the object on the retina, which is 
reversed and inverted and double, but the 
mind sees by constructing in thought a 
rational cause for its sensations. As the 
magic lantern, by means of slides and a light, 
projects a picture which conforms to the na- 
ture of the scene upon the slide and ^is n 

* Sensation contains the primal elements f f e 1p- as 
well as of knowing, and is cause of both knowi ^ ni 
feeling 



interpretation of it; so the mind, by means 
of its sensations and the light of intuition, 
projects the outer world conforming to its 
sensations so as to account for them by 
assigning some object as their cause. This 
figure is as nearly a perfect illustration as a 
physical fact can be of a mental one. The 
process is the same with all the other senses. 

"But we are not concious of this process," 
says one. Neither are we of the heart-beat, 
nor of breathing, nor of the existence of the 
liver, nor of its secreting bile, but examina- 
tion reveals the facts. ISleither are we con- 
scious of the process of acquired perception, or 
perceiving, by using the knowledge given by 
one sense as the evidence of the linowledge 
which might be gained by another. "I go 
into a darkened room and perceive, by the 
sense of smell, the presence of a tuberose 
though I neither see nor touch it. I look at 
the white iron and say it is hot although 
heat is felt. A man strikes a barrel and says 
it is full or empty. A surgeon by the sense 
of hearing perceives the condition of his pa- 
tient's lungs." We judge distance by size in 
adult life, but the child reaches out for the 
moon just as for his ball. We judge of size 
also by assumed distance and thus perceive 
men at a distance as men although sight re- 
veals them as boys in stature. Likewise we 
judge of distance by intensity of color or dis- 
tinctness of outline. For illustration, dis- 
tances are very deceptive to persons going 
from a moist climate to one having a clearer 
atmosphere, because outline and color are 
more distinct than the person is accustomed 
to associate with similar distances. 

We have sensations formed by one half of- 



tlie surface of an orange, but we perceive an 
entire orange, the body, taste, and odor as 
well as the surface. But acquired percep- 
tions are not direct; they are based on pre- 
vious experiences and the exercise of the 
higher powers of memory and judgment. 
Their value to us is immeasurable. 

Unless sensations are clear^ that is^ the or- 
gans of sense are in perfect condition and 
the sensation has attention, the perception 
cannot be perfect, and if it is not^ no result- 
ing mental process can be clear, vivid, and 
reliable. Sensation and perception usually 
occur at the same instant, but not always- 
When absorbed in study one may only per- 
ceive, when some one speaks (the ear un- 
doubtedly being affected), that something has 
occurred, or that some one is present, or 
spoke, or who spoke, or what was said. 
These various perceptions may be in the 
same instant as the sensation, or the cause of 
the sensation may not be perceived till the 
attention is released from the subject under 
consideration. 

Perception Is the act of assigning a cause 
for sensation. 



LESSOI^ lY. 



MEMORY. 



"The great Keeper, or Master of the Rolls, of the soul. 
A power that am make amends for the speed of time, in 
causing him to leave hehind those things whlcli else he 
woLiU carry awaj as if they had not hten."— Bishop Hall, 

Memory is the mind's power of reprodu- 
cing its former intellectual states and recog- 
nizing them as having been part of former 
experience. Intellectual states are not things, 
but acts, and are not retained, but reproduced. 
They are not stored or kept, but recreated. 

"Except in a flgarative sense, the past is 
not in the mind at all. Our possession of a 
ImoT/Iedge of which we are not conscious, 
means only that we can reproduce that 
knowledge on occasion. Eeproduction in no 
way brings back the old fact. The particu- 
lar experience as a mental fact vanishes for- 
ever. What remains is the ability to perform 
anew the ancient function.''* That which is 
reproduced is purely an intellectual state. It 
is not a state of feeling or an act of will, but 
an intellectual state which preceded or fol- 
lowed that state of feeling or act of will 
which is reproduced. Not the emotion, but 
the knowledge of it returns though the re- 
turning knowledge of it may cause its return 
in a diminished degree. The renewed emotion 
is not an act of memory, but a result of the 
act of memory. 

* Bowne's "Psychological Theory." 



LESSON Y. 

MEMORY STI3IULI. 

What causes us to remember? 

What stimuli can cause the mind to repro- 
duce its former acts of perception and 
thouglit? 

I. The repetition of part of a previous 
mental act stimulates the mind to complete 
the entire act. This condition may be 
brought about by — 

1. The presence of the cause of the orig- 
inal act. 

2. A revival of similar or associated in- 
tellectual states; that is, states having some 
of the same elements, by means of objects 
similar to, or associated v^ith those v^hich 
caused the original mental act. One of the 
most potent causes of such revival is lan- 
guage. 

3. A revival, from any cause, of acts of 
emotion or volition, which were associated 
with the original intellectual act. 

II. An act of the will may produce the 
same result, which is quite common and is 
most applicable when one desires to recall an 
object of a certain class or of a well ordered 
series. In these cases the will causes the in- 
tellect to complete its former thought scries. 
In many cases we cannot see that the will 
operates through this first law. 

The outer causes of these mental states, 
which stimulate the mind to" re-perCorm its 



former acts, are resemUances and contrasts X)e- 
tween objects now present, and the causes of 
former states, and contiguity in time or space, 
and the relation of cause and ejfect between 
the same objects. All of these operate 
through the first law. Even contrast means 
that the objects belong to the same class; i. 
e., have the same essential elements, but dif- 
fer in detail; so one object of the contrasted 
pair contains, most of the elements in the ■ 
other, and the mind having been caused to 
perform most of the former act, completes it. 

As to size, form, color, and weight, let 

a represent an object, A another; 

6 time when seei^, B another time; 

c a cause, C its affect; 

d place where seen, D another place; 

e associated emotion, 

E same emotion from other cause; 

/ associated volition, 

F same volition from other cause. 
Their combinations represent complex mental 
states or acts, as: 

1. ahcd 4. ABC^ 

2. A6c(Z 5. ABCD 

3. aBcd 6. ABCD e/ 

7. A B C D E F 

Number 1 is an original sensation or 
thought. Later, I have the experience Num- 
ber 3 and in it the elements, except time, 
are the same as in Number 1, and having 
thought the common elements a h c, the 
mind is stimulated to complete the series 
of Number 1, and thinks the full thought 
abed. 

So, in the future, Number 2 may remind 
me of Number 1, because the two objects 
were seen at the same time or had the 



same causative power c and were seen at tlie 
same place d. 

So, Number 5 may remind me of ISTumber 1 . 
tlioiigli not containing the same elements, by 
moans of an intermediate term; for instance. 
tliOLigli the colors of a and A are different, 
A's color sets the mind to rehearsing color-^ 
and when the color of a is reached, the mind 
not only recalls the color a, but with it h cd. 

So, ISTumber 4 causes the mind to recall 
Number 3, because in our experience C has 
been associated with c as its effect; but when 
C has caused the mind to think c again, c 
causes us to think all of Number 3, or 2, or 1. 

So flows the never ending stream of thought. 
And thought becomes more surely reproduci- 
ble by noting its elements and the surround- 
ings it has in common with other thoughts. 

The secret of memory is a sense, at the 
time of the original act, of the imioortance of 
the thought to he reproduced; that is, to see its 
import for our being, welfare, and destiny. 
This results in close attention; not only seeing 
a whole, but perceiving the parts that are 
common to other wholes; and systematic thought; 
seeing an object not as alone, but as part of 
a series or system. It is not enough to se^ 
things, but to see them in their natural or- 
der and relations. Memory of recent events, 
as a rule, fails in age, while early scenes re- 
main fresh, because the old man feels that 
life is nearly over and his surroundings are 
neither new, pleasurable, nor important and 
therefore do not command attention or 
thought. While those who think themselves 
dying, recall with wonderful vividness every 
word, thought, or deed of moral import be- 
e-ause they feel that eternity depends upon 
these things. 



Do not try to make the mind a library. 

Do not try to remember anything unimpor- 
tant. 

Do not try to msike the mind a "cliarnel 
house of dead thoughts." 

Talie time to reliearse and review tliosc 
things that should be remembered: review not 
by re-seeing or re-reading; but first tal^e so lit- 
tle that the mind can without difficulty re- 
produce it, and then review from memory; 
then add a little and review again, and so on. 
There is scarcely a limit to the development 
of the memory by this plan, if one is willing 
to go slowly and steadily, but one cannot af- 
ford to give a life time to the develop- 
ment of one power, nor to preserve the past, 
unless it is used. One of heaven's chief bless- 
ings is the power to forget the unimportant 
and trifling events of life. 

Do not burden the memory with any un- 
necessary thing; nor develop it as a show- 
power; but for things necessary, give it abso- 
lute confidence and trust in its testimony be- 
cause you conform to the laws of its action. 



LESSORS" VI. 

IMAGIITATION. 

"And as innglnatlon bodies forth 
The form ot things unknown; tne poet's pen 
Turns them to shapes, and gives to nothing 
A local habitation an^l a name." 
Without guessing, science would be impossible,— 7;fM)(?."'. 

Imagination is the mind's power to re-ar- 
range the mental states or their elements 
when reproduced by memory. 



Iiniig-iLKition lias notliing' new in ifc but or- 
der. All of tlie material is farnislied by tlic 
real cxpciieaces of life. But tlie imagination 
varies the elements of shape, size, form, col- 
or, causative power, etc. Under its influence 
ail relations may change; that which in ex- 
perience was above, is placed below; the in- 
side becomes the outside; the old, new; the 
lirst, last. All the limitations of time, space, 
and cause; all the relations of truth, beauty, 
and goodness change, as the position of the 
colored glass changes in the kaleidoscope. 
And whether this wondrous power shall make 
of its possessor a philosopher, an inventor, a 
poet, a painter, a sculptor, a happy man or 
sad one, a good one or bad one, a dreamer or 
a fool, depends, first, on the thoughts fur- 
nished it; secondly, on the power controlling it. 

If directed by the will into systematic ac- 
tion, by the conscience unto a righteous end, 
by tlie reason into real and possible combina- 
tions, in the commonest life it may find col- 
ors to rival the rainbow and furnish the 
mind with flowers more beautiful than ever 
bloomed on earthly soil; it may find theories 
and hypotheses in the fall of an apple that 
shall account for the revolution and support 
of worlds; or it may, by changing the position 
of the almost powerless kettle's lid, lay the 
foundation for the utilization of powers that 
shall, unwearied, move the commerce of the 
world; it may picture to the mind of the or- 
ator, poet, painter, or sculptor, such ideals as 
have never been expressed in words, placed on 
canvas, or wrought in stone. To every occu- 
pation, it holds forth a higher possibility; to 
every life, a higher ideal. 

But, if uncontrolled, it makes the imprac- 



ticable dreamer the wild theorist and vision- 
juy. If it is the slave of the passions and 
appetites and is fed with obscenity, it will 
siak its possessor to the level of the beast; 
and if directed by selfish desires and uncon- 
trolled by conscience, its devices for gaining 
wealth, power, and place, will make the pos- 
sessor the scourge of the race, the accursed of 
God. 



LESSON YII. 

CONCEPTIOIT. 



**^ pluHhus unum.^^ 

Conception is the power of the mind to 
form general, or representative ideas or terms. 

General ideas are such as represent not 
single percepts, but groups of percepts. 

It is the algebra of the soul. 

It is the wholesale department of thought. 

It is the fountain of language. 

It is the grouping of similar percepts. 

Its best physical representation is the com- 
posite photograph. 

There are two processes of forming con- 
cepts, or general ideas; the primitive one is 
used on occasion of first experiences, especial- 
ly in childhood. The first experience is made 
to stand for all future experiences of the 
same or similar kind. The other process, 
more complex and accurate, is used by the 
experienced and trained mind. It consists in 
a recall of past experience by memory and— 

1. Comparison; 

2. Abstraction; 



;:?. General izratioiT. 

Comparison is the act of giving attention! 
to two or more objects for the purpose of not- 
ing their relations; 1. e.^ likeness and unlikc- 
ness, etc. 

Abstraction is the act of withdrawing the- 
mind's activity from the elements consti Lu- 
ting the individuality (the distinguishing 
(lualities) of the percepts (objects) so the at- 
tention is centered upon the elements com- 
mon to the several percepts. 

Generalization is the act of using the ab- 
stract as a symbol of the concrete; or, using 
the common elements in a series of perccpfcs 
to represent the individual percepts. 

This process is called conception; its prod- 
uct, the "symbol" of the above definition, is 
a concept or notion. It is not a mental image, 
or picture, but represents a class of objects, 
as X in algebra represents a class of objects 
whose number and quantity are yet unknown ,^ 
or undetermined The object of the process- 
is to handle many percepts in one, and thus 
abbreviate the thought process; for instance ^ 
instead of saying "Friend Tom, friend John, 
friend Dick, friend Harry, and friend Will 
went with me," I say, "Five friends went 
with me." 

It not only accelerates thought, but makes 
it more exact and clear; for if the mind had 
to rehearse the individuals represented by ev- 
ery concept, the main thought would be lost 
before the mind completed the rehearsal of 
large classes. By this process we throw out 
all the elements irrelevant to the conclusion, 
retaining only those essential to the purpose 
in view. It may be truly said of the con- 
cepts, as it is said of the composite photo- 



graph, that it repra^oiits no one exactly, as 
its outlines are shadowy, but it shows wliat 
is essential, or common, to tlie group. It is 
a kind of average individual. 

While all concepts imply the process of ab- 
straction, they may be classed as abstract 
and concrete. 

A Concrete Concept is applied to a class 
of material objects; as, man. 

An Abstract Concept represents a thought 
object having no separate or independent ex- 
istence; as, manhood, whiteness, sensation, 
perception, etc. 

In applying the notion, or concept to the 
individual, the mind declares the individual 
to be described by, or not to be described by, 
the concept. This is classification: dividing 
the individual percepts or their causes by 
judging their agreement or disagreement with 
the concept. Classification is very crude 
among savages and children. The natives of 
one of the Pacific islands classed goats as 
hogs, calling them "horned hogs," and horses 
as "dogs." Most people still class whales as 
&shes. 

Let us illustrate the formation of concepts 
and classes: — I see our sorrel pony, Gyp; a 
dapple-gray draft horse, Carl; a bay track 
horse, Sunol; a white Arabian steed. Slick. 
The mind considers certain elements that be- 
long to all these animals and represents this 
concept by the term horse and uses the term 
horses to represent all of them, although the 
concept is not of a sorrel, gray, bay, or white 
horse, nor of a pony, or a draft horse, a track 
horse, or an Arabian horse. 

Besides the horses, I see, also, dogs, cats, 
cattle, etc., and form a new concept quadru- 



lied, reprcsontiiig' more individaals with less in 
common. 

I S3e, also, otlisr objects, such as fishes 
reptiles, etc., and form a greater concept rep- 
resented by the word veriebrates. 

With these objects, I place trees and 
plants, forming the higher concept living things, 
or animate objects. To the.ie add the inani- 
mate world and speak of the almost unlimit- 
ed concept being, which includes all existence 
and represents the only element common to 
Thus "out of many" the mind 
and in one word and one 
thought, can mentally handle the universe, 
having reduced the universe of though b to 
unity. 

This process is generalized thus: 

ab [iron) 

abc (lead) 
abed {cop])er] 

cb [tree) 

cbd [potato) 

cbn [moss) 

gb [bird) 

gba .[flsh) 

gbr [beast) 

fb [God) 
fbc [angel) 
J'bcd [man) 

Definitioi^ is the act of so describing any- 
thing that another may surely know it. To 
this end the description should give, first, the 
class to which the object belongs; i. e., th^ 
essential attributes, or the concept of which 
it is a part; second, the characteristics which 
distinguish its species from the other species 
composing the class; third, the peculiarities 
which mark its Individuality; i. e., distinguish 
it from others of its species. 



Percepts 



(Concept ab 
[minerals) 

S Concept cb 
[vegetables) 

(Concept gb 
[animals) 

I Concept fb 
{ [spirits) 



CD-I; 

o 
O 



I. A clcriiiition must not contain the term 
defined. 

II. A dciinition must not contain obscure, 
llgimitive, or ambiguous terms. 

"III. A dciinition sliould not be negative. 



LESSON YIII. 

JUDGMENT. 

JuDQMEz^TT is tlie act of affirming or deny- 
ing the identity of two percepts or concepts, 
(tr the inclusion of a percept by a concept, 
after comparing the one with the other. 

A Proposition is a judgment expressed in 
\Yords. 

Whether a proposition affirms or denies iden- 
tity, it invariably declares that one percept 
or concept is equal to or part of the other, 
;iQd is an act of classification. If I affirm that, 
*'A11 men are mortal," I declare "all men" 
to belong to and be part of the class "mor- 
tals." If I deny identity by saying that, "All 
men are not mortal," I affirm nothing less 
than that, "Some men belong to the class of 
not-morfcals, or immortals." If I say, "The 
man is guilty," I practically affirm that, "the 
uian" belongs to or is part of the class 
"guilty men." 

In a judgment there are always two and 
only two ideas (percepts or concepts) com- 
pared; one represented by the subject, the 
other by the predicate of the proposition. 

The names of the ideas are known as terms, 
and are classed as singular and general; the 



former being the names of single things; the 
latter, the names common to many things; 
that is, class names. 

The name of many things regarded as a 
unit is a collective term. 

The names of objects are called concrete 
terms; the names of qualities, abstract terms. 

Terms which express existence of qualities 
are 2^ositive. Terms which express absence of 
qualities are negative. These classes are not 
exclusive. 

There are three classes of propositions: 

I. Categorical, in which the judgment is 
positively affirmed or denied; as, He will 
speak. 

II. Hypothetic Aii, in which it is condi- 
tionally affirmed or denied; as. He will speak 
if—. And 

III. Disjunctive, in which the judgment 
suspends determination between two or more 
alternatives; as. He will speak or sing. 

Categorical propositions are classified as not 
only affirmative and negative, but also as uni- 
N^ersal and particular. If the proposition af- 
firms the predicate to belong to all of the 
subject, it is universal; as, "All metals are 
elements." But if we say, "Some metals are 
brittle," the quality is affirmed of only an 
indefinite portion of the metals. ISuch prop- 
ositions are particular. 

The signs of universality are all, every, each. 
any, the whole, etc. The signs of particular 
propositions are some, certain, most, many, a 
few, etc.; but these signs are not always pT^s- 
ent. 

JVb, not, and none are negative signs. 

When a proposition affirms or denies some- 



tiling of tlie whole of one of its terms, tliat 
term is said to Tbe distributed. 
Hence there are foar kinds of propositions: 
Affirmative A 



Universal 



Proposition 



xsegative E 



1 Particular i Affirmative I 
\ ]N^egative O 



Subject Predicate 

J.— Distributed Undistribated. 
jB— Disuribated Distributed. 

J— Undistributed Undistributed. 
O — Undistributed Distributed. 

A. A' stulies are practical. 

E. Ko study is practical. 

I. borne studies are practical. 

O. Some studies are not practical. 

In the judgment A, it is implied that O is 
false, and vice versa; in IE, tliat I is false, 
and vice versa. If either A ov E is true, the 
other must be false; both may be false. I 
and may both be true; but if either one is 
false, the other must be true. If A or ^ is 
true, J or O must be true. If lor O is false, 
JL or jE/ is also false. 

This process of conclusion is called iraplied 
judgment. 

Good or true judgment is the foundation of 
sound reason. 

These classes are represented by the inclu- 
clusion or exclusion of the following figure -: 
A E 





All Msudid are 
Elements. 



No Me';i!8 are 
Compounds. 




Some Metals are 
Brittle Subst:inces.. 



Some Metals are not 
Brittle Subhtauces. 



LESSOI!^ IX. 



HEASON. 



Reasoning is the same process as perception, with tin's 
difference: perception Is inferential respecting objects 
present and reasoning is inferential respecting objects ab- 
sent.— Lewes. 

Keasoning is the act of inferring an un- 
known proposition by comparing two known 
propositions having a common term; — or, it is 
the process of forming a jiidjment of the re- 
lation of two percepts or concepts, or a per- 
cept and a concept by comparing eacli with a 
third; as, a=x', 5=3?; tlierefore a='b. 

The SYLI.OGISM is tlie ideal form of reason- 
ing. When not expressed, it is im]3lied. It 
consists of three propositions, or judgments, 
called the Major Premise, the Minor Premise, 
and the Conclusion. 

The Conclusion is the inferred proposi- 
tion. 

The Minor Term is the subject of the con- 
clusion. 

The Major Term is the predicate of the con- 
clusion. 



The Middle Term is the one common to both 
premises. With it each of tlie others is com- 
pared. 

Tii3 Matop. Premise contains tlie major 
term. 

The MijSTOR Premise contains tlie minor 
term. 

In tlie algebraic illustration above, a is the 
subject of the proposition a=6, which ex- 
presses the conclusion and is, therefore, the 
minor term: and b, the predicate, is the ma- 
jor term; x, with which each is compared, 
is the middle term; and a=x and 6=x are 
respecfcively the minor and major premise? 
beciiuse they contain respectively the minor 
term a and the major b. 

LcGic is the science which treats of the 
law^s of reason. It is of the same value to 
correct thinking that Physiology is to correct 
living. Both studies have their origin in de- 
praved action, mental or physical. Logic is 
valuable in proportion as mistakes in drawing 
conclusions are common. The syllogism is 
unnecessary in thinking in familiar lines, as 
a map is needless in traveling well known 
roads. So, one of the premises is offcen omit- 
ted. This form is called an Enthymeme. 
For example: "Socrates is a man; therefore, 
Socrates must die." Often neither premise 
is stated and the conclusion stands alone. 
But when investigation begins and the fron- 
tiers and fundamentals of science are to be 
explored, the formal and definite statements 
of the syllogism make the detection of error 
much easier, and the resulting conclusion 
more accurate. 



lesso:n" X. 

EEASOIT, INDUCTIYE AND DEDUCTIVE. 

O God, I think thy great thoughts after th e.—Keplfr. 
But reason can only give us probability, not certainty,— 
James Freeman Clarice. 

The process of reasoning begins witli anal- 
ogy. 

Analogy is the judgment that what is 
true of some things is true of anofcher simi- 
lar thing. 

A child expects today what he had yester- 
day. If one person gives liim a penny, lie ex- 
pects the next one to do so, until he discov- 
ers that all persons are not alike or similar. 
He expects his sled to run down hill till he 
tinds that the surface of a bare hill is not 
like that of a snow covered hill. But with 
the passing years, he learns to presume from 
his experiences that like causes and omduions 
produce like results; or, in other words, that na- 
ture is uniform; for the seeming exceptions to 
the rule have mostly been explained, and he 
judges the others will be. With this great 
proposition he places others and reasons in 
this wise: For twenty years the sun has risen 
every twenty-four hours. jN'atare is uniform 
in her action. Therefore the sun will rise 
every twenty-four hours hereafter. This def- 
inite form of analogy is called induction. 

Induction is the act of deriving general 
laws from individual cases;— or, it is the act 
of judging, or concluding that what is true of 
the cases examined, is true of all similar 
cases. 



It is the method of discovery. While the 
prooess is the common property of the race, 
it was formulated by Lord Bacon. The cer- 
tainty of the conclusion is proportionate to 
the /number of particular cases examined. 
"One swallow does not make a summer." Its 
conclusions are absolutely sure only when ab- 
solutely useless; that is, when every case has 
been examined. Its value is in the power to 
determine the prohahilities in tlie unexamined 
cases. 

Deduction is the act of judging that what 
is true of the class, is true of the individ- 
uals composing it; — or, of inferring the par- 
ticular case from the general law. 

It is the method of instruction and applica- 
tion. While this process is also the common 
property of the race, it was formulated by 
Aristotle. The process is dependent for the 
accuracy of its conclusions, on tlie induction 
which furnishes its premises. It now ap- 
pears thab the act by which the mind passes 
in all reasoning from the known premises to 
the unknown conclusion, is not only an act 
of judgment, but essentially an act of faith.* 

"The distinguishing characteristic of science 
is its graduated method of verification, and 
not as some think the employment of induc- 
tion in lieu of deduction. All science is de- 
ductive and deductive in proportion to its 
separation from ordinary knowledge." 

*"Induction rests upon the assumption,— as it demands 
for Its ground,— that a personal or a thinking Deity ex- 
ists," and "that the rational methods of the Divine and 
human intellect must be the same."— Z?r. Porter, 

Philosophy proceeds upon a system of credit.— TAomp- 
son. 

To find new land we must quit sight of Und.— Lewes. 



Tii3 folio will J diagrani represents the relc& 
tions of the two processes of reasoning: 



A was a rntia 



B was a man 



€ was a man 




X was a man 



He w.ll cUi 



^9 ^ ^~~~~^ H^. wll die. 



LESSOR XI, 



REASOISry FALI^ACIES. 



H3 will dla 



Iteasonlrig is inferantial about objects f.a'm^rly given' in 
s'snsation but now absent. It is tli3 presjiitiitiou in cou- 
seiousnBss of objects, which, if actually present, would af- 
fect the consciousness in a similar way. * * * Bad reas^ii- 
liig will always be found to depend on some of the objects 
not beinij mentally present (realized.)— iewrf^s. 

Fallacies are violations of the laws of reason. 
The Laws of IncliioLbn are: "(1.) If, in all 
cases of an effect or phenomenon, one condi- 
tion is uniformly present, that is the cause 
or includes the cause of such phenomenon. 



(2,) If, 111 every instance in whicli an efiecl 
does occur, one single condition is present, 
wlilcli is uniformly absent whenever siicli ef- 
fect does not occur, this constantly^ present 
or absent condition is presumed to be its 
cause. (3.) If, whenever an effect or phenom- 
enon is marked vv^ith peculiar energy, any 
condition varies with proportional intensity^ 
this varying condition is the cause of such an 
effect." 

The basic idea of all these rules is that In- 
duction must be made not from few, but 
many instances. In taking a large number 
of cases one will probably meet all the con- 
ditions represented in the three laws and 
thus reach the truth. The fallacy of Induc- 
tion is concluding that "One swalloio makes a 
Slimmer.'^ The following illustrates: 

A quack is said to have had a patient who, 
against orders, ate a large quantity of raw 
cabbage and recovered. The quack wrote in 
ais notebook, "Cabbage cures tyj)hoid fever." 
He recommended cabbage to his next typhoid 
patient who was a Yankee and he died, so he 
wrote in his diary, "Cabbage cures French- 
men (his first patient was French) and kills 
Yankees." 

The Fallacies of Deduction are violations of 
the Laws of the Syllogism. The laws are: 

(I.) Every syllogism has three, and only 
three, terms. 

(II.) Every syllogism has three, and only 
three propositions. 

(111.) The middle term must be distributed 
once at least, and must not be ambiguous. 

(IV.) 'No term must be distributed in the 
con'jl'.ision, v/hich was not distributed in one 
of the piviiiisjs. 



(Y.) From two negative premises, no con- 
clusion can Ibe drawn. 

(VI.) From two particular premises, no con- 
clusion can be drawn. 

{VII. ) If one premise be negative or par- 
ticular, the conclusion must also be negative 
or particular. 

Violations of these laws are called Logical 
Fallacies. 

Another class is called Material Fallacies. 
They are seven in number: 

1. The Fallacy of Accidental Attributes. 

2. The Converse Fallacy of Accidental Attri- 
butes. 

3. The Irrelevant Conclusion, 
k. The Petitio Principii. 

5. The Fallacy of The Consequent. 

6. The False Cause. 

7. The Fallacy of Many Questions. 

They are illustrated by the following ex- 
iimples: 

1. What you bought yesterday, you eat to- 
■lay; you bought raw meat yesterday; there- 
fore, you eat raw meat today. 

2. Wine used i n excess is a poison; what is 
once a poison, is always a poison; therefore, 
wine is always a poison. 

3. The plaintiff's cause is just, but his at- 
torney is mean; therefore, the defendant 
should be acquitted. This is called the ar- 
gumentum ad hominem or populum, and is an 
appeal to prejudice, not reason. 

4. A moving body must be moving in the 
place where it is or where it is not; it can- 
not be where it is not, and if it moves it 
cannot be where it is; therefore, motion is 
impossible. Here it is assumed that it can- 
not move from where it is to where a mo- 



iiient ago it was not. This is called begging 
(lie question. 

5. Alfred the Great was a scholar, for he 
founded the University of Oxford. This is a 
conclusion that does not follow from the 
])i-emises, and amounts to a simple assertion 
of the conclusion. 

6. Night folloAYS day; an effect follows a 
cause; therefore, night is the effect of day. 

7. Many questions will not all have the 
.same answer, and you cannot overthrow an 
argument by asking, "Have you left off beat- 
ing your mother?" 

The most common fallacy is the use of a 
term with two meanings in the same syllo- 
gism or with a different meaning in the 
minds of the speaker and hearer or writer 
and reader. 

It is not the term or word which is impor- 
tant, but the meaning or idea it represents. 



LEbtSOJ^ XIII. 

SENSIBILITY, — EMOTIONS . 

The words Sensibility and Feelings, in the 
broadest sense of the term, are equivalent. 

Prof. Bowne says, "No definition of Feel- 
ing can be given. We can only identify and 
name it. * * We might, then, deline feeling as 
that state of consciousness which consists in 
some form of pleasure or pain, like or dis- 
lilie, satisfaction or dissatisfaction. Of course 
this is not a definition, but only an identifi- 
cation. What the terms mean can be known 
only in experience.'' 

Sensation contains not only the primal ele- 
ment of the higher intellectual activity, but 
also of the mental acts knov/n as acts of 
the sensibility. It is not only an act of 
knowledge, but also of feeling. 

Sensation, intuition, perception, memory, 
imagination, conception, judgment and rea- 
son — not only all intellectual activity, but 
acts of volition are causes of those changes 
of mental state known as Emotion; and emo- 
tions in turn are causes of Desire. These 
two divisions of the acts of the sensibility 
are distinguished from one another by their 
causes and their effects. 

Emotions are those acts of the sensibility 
which are caused directly by acts of intellect 
or will and do not act as motives to volition. 
but are the causes of desire. 

Desires are those acts of the sensibility 
which are caused by the emotions, and act 
directly on the will as motives to volition. 



The emotions, and consequently the de- 
sires wliicli are caused by them, are divided 
according to their causes into three classes, 
n:imely: 

Pliy.slcal, those caused by physical states; 

Physio-P.^ydLlcal, those caused by physical 
and intellectual states; and 

Psychical, those caused by purely mental 
states. 

The purpose of the Physical Emotions is 
the preservation and proper development of 
the body, by interesting the mind in its 
partner, making the comfort of one depend 
on the welfare of the other. They tend to 
regulate exertion and volition. They are 
subdivided into two classes, negative, (such 
as, weakness, weariness and discomfort), and 
positive, (such as, conscious strength or vital- 
ity and pain and pleasure). Pain is not a 
curse, but a blessing warning us of danger. 
The soul that can enjoy most, can suffer 
most. 

The Creator has made this class of emo- 
tions intense, "to prevent the tireless, ener- 
getic, ambitious soul from prematurely wear- 
ing out and destroying the body. All exper- 
ience proves that even cultivated minds can- 
not be safely trusted with the care of the 
body, unguarded by these faithful monitors." 
Then how carefully should the teacher note 
these signs of trouble, that divide and ought 
to divide the attention of his classes till giv- 
en recreation and rest. And no student 
should work on while the body protests. ]^o 
one has a moral right to trample underfoot 
the protest of his body, or the bodies of oth- 
ers. 

The Physio-Psychical emotions are caused 



by an intellectual apprehension of a physical 
state. They are not so intense, hut more 
persistent than the first class. Of these emo- 
tions there are three pairs, cheerfulness and 
melancholy, interest and ennui, anxiety and 
indifference. These emotions are generally of 
physical origin, but sometimes are caused by 
purely intellectual or volitional acts. They 
re-act on the mind unfitting it for business, 
society, or study, limiting power and in- 
fluence, or they make attractive, useful, and 
careful, those who were otherwise of indiffer- 
ent ability. The third group of emotions is 
called Psychical. Their cause is purely men- 
tal. These emotions are characterized by in- 
tensity, depth, and energy; also by brevity. 
As a rule intense feelings are short lived. Of 
this group, there are six divisions, namely: 1. 
Wonder, surprise, admiration; these are caused 
by the strange, the unexpected, the unusual, 
the contradictory, etc. 2. Ludicrous, disgust, 
contempt; the purpose of these is to restrain 
men from, first, "The undignified, the incon- 
gruous, and the little; and second, the low, 
the mean, the vile, and the contemptible." 
3. iShame, sorrow, pity; the causes of these 
may be our own acts, or states, or those of 
others. Their purpose is to exert a regenera- 
ting moral influence and stimulate to a purer 
life. 4. Fear, horror, despair; these have 
causes in conscious weakness, guilt, and dan- 
ger. These emotions are much effected by 
physical states. They are intended to cause 
men to shun danger, wrong, and sin. 5. 
Beauty, sublimity, reverence; these emotions 
are caused by judgments of the relation of 
the causes of sensation, and the necessary 
ideas of the intuition. The end of these is 



Imman liapioiness and perfection. 6. Moral 
approval and disapproval; these emotions are 
caused by an act of reason in which^the 
mind comioares the act of the will with the 
standard of right given in the primitive judg- 
ments, and concludes their agreement or disa- 
greement. 

The moral emotions are moved only in view 
of our own voluntary acts or those of our fel- 
low men. No inanimate object and no act 
of even the most intelligent animal stirs 
them. 



LESSON XIY. 

SENSIBILITY,— DESIRES. 

A DESIRE is a demand for some gratifica- 
tion and is caused by the pleasure of emo- 
tion and is in turn a cause of or tendency 
toward volition. Desire is the basis of civili- 
zation and human advancement. Without it 
man would still be a savage, content to sit in 
his miserable abode and feed on carrion; yes, 
without it the race would cease to be. Out 
upon that silly affectation of effete social 
conditions which considers it "vulgar" to 
have an appetite. He only is strong whose 
body and will are underlaid with a volcano 
of controlled desires. And none of them, not 
even the acquired appetites or malevolent im- 
pulses,*" is without its place and part in our 
preservation and development; and none of 
them is wrong. They are God-implanted, as 
much as are arms or eyes. The wrong asso- 
ciated with them is not in the desire, but in 



the gratification by wrong objects, and condi- 
tions oat of harmony witli the judgment. 
What more terrible thing can befall man, 
more surely heralding disease, or death, than 
the state portrayed in the last chapter of Ec- 
clesiastes — that marvelous description of old 
age — where it is written that "desire shall 
fail." The desires, like the emotions, are of 
three kinds. Physical, Physio-Psych. cil, and 
Psychical, according to their causes. 

The Physical desires are known as appe- 
tites. They are hunger, thirst, sexual pas- 
sion, etc. Their essential characteristics are: 

1. They are purely physical in origin. 

2. They are occasional and not continuous. 

3. They involve a sense of physical uneas- 
iness. 

4. Their gratification causes a degree of 
pleasure proportionate to the intensity of the 
appetite. 

5. Gratification temporarily destroys appe- 
tite. 

6. Continued abstinence weakens appetite. 
Their purpose is the preservation and re- 

l)roduction of the race, rather than, though 
along with, human happiness. In infancy 
they are instinctive, but in later life should 
be controlled by the will in accord with rea- 
son. They are of two kinds, natural and mor- 
bid. The acquired morbid appetites seem to 
be a balance wheel thit prevents the jar of 
change of habits and tends to prevent the ir- 
regularity which seems more destructive than 
steady vice. 

The Physio-Psychical desires, or propensi- 
ties, are of two kinds, the selfish and the so- 
cial. 

The Selfish Propensities are self-love, self- 



preservation, self-assertion, and self-gratitica- 
tion,— and curiosity, (desire of knowledge), 
acquisitiveness, (desire of possession), and am- 
bition, (desire of power). 

Tlie Social Propensities are imitativeness, 
(desire to do like others), emulation, (desire 
to excel), approbativeness, (desire of esteem), 
and veracity, (love of truth). 

;None of these should rule the soul, lll^one 
of these should be underrated. The two 
classes should be balanced. To fulfil the 
command, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as 
thy self," do not strive to love self less, but 
your neighbor more. The command does not 
ask emasculation of your own nature. Reli- 
gion does not ask destruction of our individ- 
uality, but development of it. There is not 
one of these desires whose absence will not 
wreck human life, and the rule of some of 
them is equally destructive. He who has no 
desire for knowledge, property, or power, will 
neyer be wise, rich, or influential, nor widely 
useful. He who does not care to excel will 
reach no high degree of excellence. He wiio 
does not desire the esteem of others has lost 
one of the strong stays of virtue, and power- 
ful motives of exertion. He who loves not 
the truth has little that is hopeful in his 
mental or moral future. 

The Psychical desires are known as affec- 
tions and moral impulses. 

The affections are malevolent and benevo- 
lent: 

The malevolent affections are indifference, 
resentment, hatred, and envy. Their possi- 
ble objects may be animals, men, or God. 
These affections are all disagreeable and wear- 
ing on health, nervous force, and intellectual 



and moral character. The purpose of these 
affections is self-protection, and to promote 
justice by the punishment of crime. 

The benevolent affections are such as wish 
well to others. They are divided by their ob- 
jects into three classes: 

1. Love of animals; 2. Love of men, — in- 
dividuals, home, and country; 3. Love of 
God. These affections are stirred not so much 
by the objects as by our relations to them. 
We love animals because they are creatures 
of our Creator and are much like us. We 
love men because, "we be brethren," and have 
a common Father, God. We love God be- 
cause he is good and "first loved us." 

The Moral impulses are the stimuli of 
character. Woe to him in whom they are 
dead, in whom right and wrong are merely a 
judgment and an emotion, and in whom there 
is no wish to do the right, or shun the wrong; 
his character will scarcely outride life's 
storms of temptation. These impulses are 
characterized by persistence, but do not, like 
the lower desires, cease with gratification. 
God has so constituted us that, "The smiles 
of an approving conscience bring a peace and 
joy that are enduring." 

The judgments, emotions, and desires of 
the human soul are unerring, infallible as to 
the moral character of our motives and pur- 
poses, but often fail as to our acts, being no 
more accurate than our intellectual develop- 
ment is perfect. 



LESSOl!^ XY. 

THE WILL. 

The WILL is the mind's power of determin- 
ation and self-activity; or it is the self-caused 
activity of the mind. 

Much of human activity is involuntary like 
the breathing, the heart-beat,, etc. Much 
even of intellectual activity arises instinct- 
ively and necessarily, and while, in most in- 
tellectual and sensible activity, the mind 
is passive, only reacting against the external 
cause, there is a realm where the mind is the 
ground and cause of its own acts. It is the 
realm of the will. The act of the will is free 
—not determined by externality, but by it- 
self. We feel that it is free, and hold our- 
selves accountable for our determinations be- 
cause, and only when, we feel that we could 
have done otherwise. 

Here is the whole realm of morals. Our re- 
sponsibility for our thought is limited to our 
sincerity of purpose to find the truth. Our 
responsibility for emotions and desires, to our 
will to control them. No act, unless it be 
freely chosen, has any moral character, l^o 
approbation or disapprobation of the con- 
science of an intelligent mind can fall upon 
any but chosen, purposeful acts. And it is 
the great business of life to subordinate the 
whole being to the will of an intelligent, cul- 
tured mind by constantly narrowing the realm 
of the instinctive and involuntary, and broad- 
ening the realm of the voluntary, the con- 
trollable. The will is the mainspring of all 



power, intellectual and physical, and it i-s 
capable of almost unlimited development by 
rational exercise. Stubbornness is irrational 
determination. 

Pupils will yield and obey with others more 
readily than alone. If avoidable, do not mal^e 
demands of pupils under strong opposing emo- 
tions. 



LESSOI^ XVI. 

CONSCIOirSNESS AND ATTENTIOK. 

Consciousness is mind in action;— or it is 
the condition of mental action. There is notli- 
ing gained by saying that it is the mind's 
power to know its own states, or acts, for 
that would require another coii.scioii.sness to 
know that it knows its own states, and so on 
iiidetinitely, IS'either is consciousness limited 
to knowing. Consciousness varies in degree 
from the slight iictivity of the faint dream 
state through the semi-conscious condition 
^vllen body or mind has been over-v/orked, to 
the point where intellect, sensibility and 
will hasten from sensation through instan- 
ianeous conclusion and deep feeling to im- 
mediate and all absorbing action. 

Attention (of unspeakable imi^ort to the 
teacher) is voluntary consciousness; — or intel- 
lectual activity under the direction of the 
will. To hold and develop this power is suc- 
cess for the teacher. The attention of a child 
is ever changing from one object to another. 
To give continuous attention wearies . it; 
therefore, develop instant, as the basis of 



attention. Attention begins with 
tlie pleasing, but must end wlien the most 
distasteful thing shall absorb us in needed 
consideration. Attention is much more in- 
tense in doing and investigating than in hear- 
ing. 

Physical comfort is essential to attention; 
therefore, light, heat, ventilation, seating 
and change of position must be regarded in 
the school-room. 

The teacher must he earnest, not shamming 
it. He may call the attention of a wanderei- 
by a pause, a movement of hand, or head, or 
a glance of the eye, or a question directed to 
him. Questions should be stated to the whole 
class, not indicating to any pupil by look, ges- 
ture, or any means that he is to answer, till 
the question is stated. Do not repeat a ques- 
tion, jior wait for an answer. Concerted men- 
tal exercises in arithmetic, or other branches 
requiring immediate answer, are powerful 
stimuli of attention. Calisthenics also ranks 
high for this purpose. But above all things 
else a good reason for it is the supreme motive 
for attention, and attention is the basis of 
Sensation, Memory and Thought. Give the 
child a reason why he studies each subject; 
let him see its import. Create a motive. 



LESSOI^ XYII. 



DEVELOPMENT. 



For now we know in part.— PawZ. 

Education is development, not creation. 
What can be done by development depends 
on the material on which you begin. Men 
are not made in one generation. The indi- 
vidual character on which the teacher begins 
is both basis and limit of results. Culture 
can not make an oak of an ash, but can 
vastly hasten its growth and improve its 
form. So you need not fear destroying indi- 
viduality. It should be remembered that the 
teacher cannot deal with the individuality of 
his pupils, but must deal with that which is 
common to all. His study must be of the 
concept mind, the subject of psychology, not 
the individual of which phrenology teaches(?). 

The teacher must not expect to see real- 
ized in the child, the exact and diagrammed 
thought processes of psychology, which is the 
science of ideal mental activity; but must 
look forward to such processes as the goal of 
education. Mental development is slow. 
While we cannot investigate directly, and 
memory does not bring back the earliest 
thought, we may reasonably infer that the 
manner of early development is like the later, 
from the indefinite to the definite. The infant 
has sensation after sensation in which it is 
almost passive, barely noting the differences 
in them; then it strives to account for the 
differences, and pictures forth causes differing 
just enough to account for the few and often 



trifling variations observed in sensation. But 
later sensations and experiences demand that 
we make causes to differ more," because our 
sensations are more varied and the varying 
elements are more noticed. For instance, a 
stove and a picture of a stove produce the 
same sensation to a child that does not touch 
them, but after the sense of touch has been 
exercised he accounts for the difference by 
perceiving two causes, one having colored 
surface, and one having weight, heat, body. 
Later the idea becomes more definite by see- 
ing different stoves and by discovering differ- 
ing internal constructions and purposes. The 
indefinite percex3t that would account for the 
sensations produced by a picture only, van- 
ishes and is replaced by one having definite 
form, color, size, purpose, construction, etc. 

Development is not partial, but integral. The 
common idea that in childhood the percep- 
tive faculties first develop, then the repro- 
ductive, then the reason, is simply nonsense. 
The Will HCts in the attention of every sen- 
sation; the Judgment, in every perception; 
the Sensibility, with every judgment. Mental 
powers never act separately, but always in 
combination. The mind is a unit. It is like 
a series of cog-wheels of which you can not 
move one without moving all. 

An illustration of the activity of reason in 
early childhood is found in the following con- 
versation of two girls, four and two years 
old. The older girl produced the following 
universal affirmation, "Everything is God's,*' 
and added, "I am God's girl." The younger 
replied, "I ain't God's girl. S'pose papa'd- 
give me away?" The elder one replied, "Yes, 
you are." And the younger, neglecting to ar- 



gue her case farther, proceeded to break the 
universal affirmative by an individual nega- 
tive. She had a pair of small scissors in her 
hand and said, ''These scissors ain't God's; 
Mrs. S. gave them to me." 

The development of perception and reason 
are synchronous. Many never reach a point 
of systematic thought and reason; neither do 
they, of accurate perception. We never see 
or thinlc more accurately or precisely than 
our purpose demands. The purpose— the object 
in view, is the primary element in determin- 
ing development. For instance, one sees a 
house well enough to know it again; another 
well enough to know its value; another well 
enough to build like it. 

The secondary element is the presence of 
the developed mind. He who thinks causes 
thought; he who feels produces feeling; he 
who wills, chooses, determines, moves others 
to volition by a process similar to electrical 
induction.* 

Psychology, so far as the school teacher is 
concerned, is not studied to be taught nor 
merely or principally to be used as the key of 
method, but for a guide in personal culture. 
Then, if you think correctly, your pupils 
learn the same thought processes and get a 
concrete psychology. 

Moral education must be by induction. 
The teacher must be an example of self-con- 
trol, love of truth, justice and righteousness. 
He must love others as himself and the pupil 
will carry his spirit into his own life. 

*ln!iucti m is the peculiar po^er of bodies charged with 
electii'. ty to reproduce their electrical state In bodies 
near to, but not in contact with them. 



LESSON XVIII. 



HABIT. 



Holy habits give the place 

\Mth the noblest, best, 

All most Godlike of thy race.— Dawes. 

"But it may be asked, does it depend merely on our will 
to correct and reform our bid habits? It certainly does 
not; neither does it depend on the w.il of a patient, who 
has despised the advice of a physician, to recover that 
health which has been loht by profligacy. "V^hen we have 
thrown a stone we cannot control its flight." 

Habit is a tendency of mind an^ body to re- 
peat former acts. It might be called Inertia 
of the soul. There are habits of thinking, 
feeling, walking, sitting, digesting, etc. 

Habits of doing things in a particular way 
are created by doing them that way. 

Habits, good or bad, are formed before we 
know right from wrong and parents and 
teachers should see that when a child comes 
to years of accountability it shall be with a 
bias toward doing right instead of a con- 
firmed habit of wrong-doing to contend 
tigainst. First acts are seldom purposeful and 
are performed before we have knowledge of 
their moral character. 

We learn to do by doing not by being told 
or shown how nor by being scolded for not 
doing. Do things right; demand that your 
pupils do things right, for as we do so we will 
do. 

The advantages of habit are speed, accur- 
acy and ease. What is done slowly at first is 
done rapidly after much repetition. The pow- 
er of addition so inaccurate in the beginner 



bacomes certain in the practical book-keeper. 
TS^ot only so, but what at first requires great 
effort becomes automatic and can be done 
witti little attention, exertion or weariness. 
By our acts we are forming habits now that 
will determine character, power and destiny. 
But habit is not without its disadvantages. 
We cannot get along without the customary 
lines of travel called roads, but they tend to 
become ruts. He who never tries new ways 
never improves. Yariation is essential to im- 
provement. "Habit is not the pilot direct- 
ing the vessel; it is the vessel abandoned to 
the force of the current, the influence of the 
tides and the control of the winds." We 
need all these forces and the pilot, a rational 
will, choosing among these mighty powers 
those that will help us to our desired haven 
and. if need be stemming the current and 
facing the tide. 



LESSON XIX. 




YO0ABULARY. 



This vocabulary is added because numbers 
of philosophical terms are used in the text 
without deilnition and are used with mean- 
ings more limited than those in daily use. It 
has oeen the purpose of the author to use 
words in their most definite and consequent- 
ly narrow meaning in order to avoid ambigu- 
ity and consequent confusion of thought. 

Psychology has suffered and been almost 
lost in discussions over ambiguities by having 
no exact nomenclature like chemistry, but 
only a specialized use of common terms. 

It is believed the definitions of the text will 
be more clear for comparison with those be- 
low, some of which are varied statements of 
those in the body of the work, some repre- 
sent the use and views of other authors and 
some are the every day uses of the terms. 

Abstract— Abstraction.— (From abs and 
traho, to draw away from.) Lesson YII. 

To separate mentally. 

Tlie power of considering certain qualities 
or attributes of an object apart from the 
rest. — Stewart. 

Much used as the opposite of concrete. 

-An abstract name is the name of an attri- 
bute. A concrete name belongs to an object. 

"Abstract ideas," Lesson II, are ideas of 
relations, qualities, etc. which have no inde- 



pendent existence, but result from a meiitui 
separation or analysis. 

All concepts are abstract. 

Act — Action. — To do; deed: to will; to 
cause. 

The exercise of a power or property. 

Act does not necessarily imply a result: 
action does. 

Our acts originate in our wills. 

Attributes and qualities are simply modes 
of action upon our senses. 

Analog Y.^;Gr. ana logia, proportionate.) 
Lesson X. Similarity of relations rather 
than of things. 

Analogy refers to causes; resemblance to 
(ippearances. 

Likeness is between two things; analogy be- 
tween two relations. Two similar relations 
can exist only between three or more things. 

Law of analogy. — The same attributes may 
be assigned to distinct, but similar things, 
provided, they can be shown to accompany 
the points of resemblance in the things and 
not the points of difference. 

Attention. — [attendo, to reach or stretcli 
toward.) Lesson XYI. 

"The voluntary directing of the energy of 
the mind towards an object or act." 

"Attention to external things is observation. 
Attention to the subjects of our own con- 
sciousness is reflecti07i. 

Attribute. — [attrihuo, to ascribe.) Quality: 
power. A power to act in a certain way or 
produce a certain result. 

Being. — Cause; substance; existence. That 
which acts. 

Believe— Belief. — ^Assent; conviction; cer- 
tainty; faith. 



Belief admits of degrees of certainty. 

As used in psycliology it lias no reference 
10 wliat ^ believed. 

Cause. — A relation, wliicli see. 

That which produces change. 

The efficient cause is the principle oi:" cliange 
or motion. 

The final cause is- the purpose for whicli 
anything exists or acts. 

"The general idea of caus3 is that wibh xiit 
whicli another tiling called tli3 eiiejt caiinot 
be." 

CoGNiTioisi'. — Knowing; perceiving. 

Co:>irAiiiso]sr.— (to place together.) Lesson. 
VII. Knowledge of externals begins in com- 
parison of sensations, (see Lesson XVII); is 
increased by comparison of percepts resulting- 
in the concept. Comparison of lliesc forms 
the judgment and comparison of judgments 
is reasoning — the highest act of tli3 inteliec. 
— -the perfection of perception. 

Conceive. — {con and ccq^eri', to talvc togeth- 
er.) 

Commonly used as a synonym of imagine, 
think, supp ).;3 and believe, bat in psj^chology 
it means to form a concept. 

Co]srcp:pT— ConceptiojST. — Lesson VII. A 
group of attribaies common to two or more 
indiYiduals or percepts. 

Conclusion.— The result of reason or argu- 
ment. That which is inferred from the prem- 

CoNCRETE. — [con-cresco, to grow together). 
Undivided; real; as it exists in nature. See 
abstract. 

Conscience. — (con and scio, to know togeth- 
er). 

Our judgment of the harmony or discord 



between oar ideas of rig-lifc and wrong- and our 
motives, ^purposes and intentions, togetlier 
witli our consequent emotions of approval or 
disapproval. 

Conscious.— Awake-, knowing-; mentally 
active. 

Consciousness.— 'State of activity. Lesson 
XYI. Self-consciousness is a knowledge of 
our mental nature, acts and states. 

CoNSEQUENT.^That wliicli follows as a re- 
sult or effect. 

Deduction. — [deduco, to draw from; to 
bring out of). Lesson X. Drawing a parfcic- 
nlar conclusion from a general truth. 

Desire.— Wish; longing; craving; passion; 
love; etc. A stimulus to volition and action. 
Lesson XIY. 

Effect.— The result or consequent of a 
cause. The cause produces change; that upon 
which it operates determines its nature; viz: 
note the diiferent effects of the one cause^ 
heat, on ice, wabor and powder. 

Emotions.— Lesson XIII. A form of feel- 
ing; a class of acts of the sensibility, caused 
by knowledge, but not directly affecting the 
will. 

ENTiTY.^Being; that which acts; the cause 
and object of sensation and thought. 

FACULTY.^Power to do certain things, 
^'acuities and powers are not divisions of the 
mind, but possibilities for the mind. 

Fallacy. — Lesson XL An argument hav- 
ing an unjustifiable conclusion. 

Feeling.— The sense of touch. 

Feelings.— Acts of the sensibility; emo- 
tions and desires. Sometimes used as the 
equivalent of sensation. 

Faith. — Lesson X. Believing on evidence 



hings not revealed to sense; tlie act of in- 
ferring; the power to accept the conclasion 
drawn from the premises. Distinguish from 
credulity and from what is believed. 

FoiiCE. — That which produces cliange. 

Generalization. — Lesson YII. Grouping 
similars; using the common results of ab- 
straction to represent the individuals form- 
ing the class. 

Habit.— Lesson XYIII. Thurot calls habit, 
'*the memory of the organs." 

Idea.— Image; percept; notion; concept; 
thought; belief; doctrine; opinion. 

A word used to represent almost every act 
or product of the intellect. Often defined as 
a mental picture. 

Bejt used as the representative of mental 
products without distinction between them. 

I3IAGINATI0N.— Lesson VI. The power to 
reproduce the elements of former experience 
in new relations. 

Induction. — (to lead to.) Le'sson X. To 
concUide from the individual cases the gener- 
al law. 

Instinct. — A propensity prior to exper- 
ience.— Pa???/. 

A low grade of reason. 

Intellect.— Lesson I. Understanding; 
power of knowledge and thought. 

Intuition.— (inliteor, to behold.) Lesson 11. 

Tlie power to know relations as distin- 
guished from things. 

Formerly used to represent perceptions a 
priori (previous to sensation) or what is some- 
times called innate ideas. 

Judgment.— Lesson A'JII. When expressed 
in words it is called a proposition. 

"Good judgment" is the power to draw 



correct concliisiyns after comparing facts and 
evidences. 

Know— Knoavledge.— To Ibe certain; to be 
satisfied beyond doubt. 

Firm belief on sufficient grounds. 

Knowledge supposes a mind, an object and 
;i definite relation between tliem. 

Knowledge is a general term for the result 
of the various intellectual activities. 

Memory.— Lesson IV. It implies an intel- 
lectual act, the power to reproduce it, and a 
judgment of identity of the tv/o acts. The 
power to I'epL'odiice is the distinctive feature. 

Mind.— L3S3on I. That which moves. 
Mind is generic; soul, individual. 
Mind is opposed to matter; sonl, to body. 
Mind is tlie source of volition; sonl of life. 

Perceive — Perception. — To take knowl- 
edge of tiiroa;yli the senses; to obssrve. Les- 
son III. Apprehension; apperception. 

Premise. — The two propositions which af- 
ford the ground for the conclusion. 

Psychology. — (G-r. psucJie, the soul, logos, 
a discourse.) Lesson I. 

Reason. — [ratio, to think.) It is used to 
signify: 1. The intellectual powers. 2. The 
intellectual powers that distinguish men from 
brutes. 3. The power to reason. 4. The 
premises of an argumsnt. 5. A cause. 

Relation. — Tne possibility of one things 
a'^.ting upon another. 

Prepositions express relations. 

Cau^e is expressed by by, because, for, etc; 

Time by before and after; 

Sp:i:'e by here, there, above, beloio, etc; 

Ouli3r pirtsof speech also express relations, 
as, true, beautiful, good, etc. 

Sensation. — Lesson 11. An act of feeling 



and attention resulting from changes in an 
organ of sense. Distinguish from sensational. 

Seksibility. — Lesson I. Capacity for emo- 
tion and desire. 

Space. — Lesson II. Not an entity, but a 
relation, which see. An act or product of the 
the intuition. Psychologically considered it 
is an abstraction, but it does not originate 
primarily by abstraction. 

Syllogism. — Lesson IX. "The moulds of 
reason." The ideal form of argument. 

Think— Thought. — To use the higher in- 
tellectual powers; reason: reflection; medita- 
tion. 

Time. — Another class of relations. (See 
space and relation.) 

TiiUTH. — The sufficiency of our percepts to 
account for our sensations and the sufficiency 
of the limitations of our higher intellections 
to correspond as effects to our perceptions. 

Understanding. — Intellect; reason. 

ABOLITION. — Choice; power to act; the will. 

Will. — Lesson XV 
and determine. 



/ 



;i7 7f^? 



(^3f^-S 



Examination Questions 



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Numbers 1 and 2. 

'Ml'^ 1 CONTAINS all tlie ques- 
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lished in the Western School Jour- 
nal, from the examination of October 

28, 1893, to that of August 25, 1894, in- 
clusive — seven examinations. 



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